Tsunami sediment research has garnered substantial attention since the tsunami triggered by the 2011 off the Pacific coast of Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami (“2011 tsunami” hereinafter). This is because the 2011 tsunami was possibly a recurrence of the 869 AD Jogan tsunami that was a topic of sedimentology research for the last 20-plus years¹. We know for sure that tsunami sediment (composed of various sizes of particles ranging from clay and sand to large boulder²) is effective for estimating when a past tsunami occurred and its size, and is potentially the only and critical proof for tsunami that occurred from prior to the Edo Period (1603-1868 AD) dating back to prehistory, for which historical records are especially thin. Yet tsunami sedimentology is not a mature field of study and it has numerous issues and technological limitations. We currently have very few research results that are qualitatively and quantitatively sufficient for incorporating into disaster prevention plans.

While we sense Japanese society’s increased expectations on tsunami sedimentology, we realize that unless we honestly explain the difficulties and limitations to the research, society may lose trust in this field of study over the medium-to-long term. We also need to let people understand that under the current state in which we lack experts in Japan, we will not be able to expeditiously meet society’s requests.

This paper discusses the current situation and issues of tsunami sedimentology and what we must do to develop as many case studies as possible that we can incorporate into disaster prevention plans.

Japan has been a manufacturing nation, with a dominant manufacturing industry. As such, it has relied on fossil fuels such as oil and coal to maintain a steady supply of electric power. With the global push to reduce total carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions, however, Japan has faced calls to scale back its use of fossil fuels, particularly given accelerating economic growth in emerging economies such as China and India and the resultant surge in the driving population. Japan had planned to respond to these calls by raising the proportion of electric power generated by nuclear power.

However, the accidents at the nuclear power plants in Fukushima have upturned these plans. To ensure that we have a reliable source of electricity, I think we need to be very cautious before ruling out the nuclear option. Still, looking ahead, it is unquestionably difficult now to construct new nuclear power plants in Japan. So how can we secure alternative energy sources?

Renewable energy, such as solar power, wind power, biomass, and geothermal power, is best suited to the concept of “local energy production for local consumption” and should help Japan secure a domestic supply of electricity that can reduce its reliance on imports. In August 2011, the Diet approved the Act on Special Measures concerning the Procurement of Renewable Energy by Operators of Electric Utilities, which is designed to bolster use of renewable energy. The pillar of this act is the feed-in tariff system for renewable energy, in which businesses can sell electricity generated by renewable energy sources to the electric utilities.

The act is designed to encourage use of this system by setting a fixed purchase price to help ensure that it is profitable for operators, particularly for the first three years. With this system, there is no question that use of renewable energy will rise in the future. This will not only bolster the nation’s energy self-sufficiency; it will also expand “local energy production for local consumption” in Japanese communities. Promoting renewable energy will also create new business opportunities, and could potentially become part of Japan’s growth strategy.

In 2011, Japan posted its first trade deficit since 1980. Was the deficit a temporary phenomenon? And will it move back into surplus from 2012?

It is true that a decline in exports caused by the disruption to supply chains associated with the Great East Japan Earthquake and the flooding in Thailand, combined with an increase in imports of alternative energy, were significant factors for the trade deficit in 2011. In 2012, the trade balance will improve as supply chains return to normal, although it is questionable whether nuclear reactors will resume operation.

However, this does not mean that Japan’s trade balance will go back to pre-3/11 status, because a structural deficit is forming, reflecting changes in Japan’s trade structure. To provide insights into the behavior of the current account of Japan, it is essential to analyze and project the trade balance, the source of the current account surplus, along with the balance of income.

In a time of crisis, the attitude that leaders adopt is crucial.

With this in mind, last year I interviewed two of Japan’s top business leaders. Two men who are well-known as two of the most capable managers in Japan, whose companies have overcome adversity under their strong leadership. They come from completely different industries – construction equipment on the one hand, and retail on the other – but they both share an image of being “reformers” of the top companies in each industry.

Sakane Masahiro, now the Chairman of Komatsu, joined the company as a bulldozer technician. In 2001 he was appointed president. At the time, Komatsu was in the red to the tune of 80 billion yen, their worst result ever. Despite starting from negative territory, he carried out decisive structural reforms. As a “one-off major surgery”, he launched a program of reorganizing subsidiaries and cutting staff levels. He also pushed for the development of the kind “second-to-none product” that competitors would not be able to match. Under his leadership, earnings recovered rapidly.

Suzuki Toshifumi, Chairman of Seven & i Holdings, is upbeat despite the slump in consumer spending. Seven Eleven, one of the group companies, has booked record profits. And they have plans to open another 1350 stores next year. Suzuki is in high spirits, saying “The market is still not saturated. We just need to win the competition with other stores.” He is also intent on developing new markets, such as targeting older demographics.

Viewed from the perspective of a company, raising the rate of consumption tax is like increasing prices. So how can the government get the people on board? In this article, these two leaders, who have had to face up to their customers and staff as they pursued reforms, give their opinions on raising taxes based on their personal experiences.

The financial crisis in the euro zone has evolved into an actual economic crisis as a result of the credit contraction it incited. The European Central Bank (ECB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) to a certain extent delayed the inevitable with their emergency assistance, but this crisis will not be resolved unless the European Union fundamentally reforms the economic and financial structures at their core. For Japan, the crisis in the euro zone is not just fire on the opposite riverbank. This is because Japan’s government debts, including those of central and local governments, have surpassed those owed by Greece’s governments at the epicenter of the euro zone crisis. Japan’s government debts currently total around 200% of the country’s domestic product (GDP). Moreover, social security and related expenses are likely to continue rising in Japan due to a population now aging at the fastest pace in the world. The worst financial conditions among advanced nations could cause Japanese government bonds to crash and throw the country’s economy into chaos unless the Japanese government boldly implements drastic measures for restoring fiscal soundness. Financial problems are time bombs implanted in the Japanese economy.

However, though these problems are frequently discussed in Japan, there is a scant sense of the crisis needed for spurring policy and system reforms aimed at resolving them. Ordinary Japanese citizens want to avoid policies that pain them. Japanese politicians are also making no attempt to look squarely at the critical reality. The Noda administration inaugurated by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) at long last began taking steps based on its policy of “integrated social security and tax reforms,” including a consumption tax increase, but the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the largest opposition party, is continuing to demand dissolution of the Diet, instead of asking the ruling party to commence financial reforms. Many Diet members affiliated with the DPJ also oppose a consumption tax increase. Discussions in the Diet have turned into bargaining among political parties, in other words politics with the next general elections in mind, instead of policy debate on the financial problems themselves. The absence of a sense of crisis about the problems has brought about this political situation.